The COVID-19 pandemic catalyzed a transformative shift in the European food service industry, with local restaurants increasingly turning to online food delivery platforms (OFDPs) to sustain their operations during lockdowns. However, this symbiotic relationship has raised concerns regarding the prevalence of Most Favoured Nation clauses (MFNs) within contractual agreements between local restaurants and OFDPs These clauses, designed to ensure price parity across different sales channels, have sparked debates over their impact on competition and consumer welfare. This is due to their potential effect of hindering local restaurants’ ability to compete effectively, thus, consumers may face reduced price options and higher food costs. The Bundeskartellamt’s landmark decisions regarding MFNs in the online accommodation sector concerning Booking.com have provided initial guidance, but the application of this approach to OFDP markets remains complex. Against this backdrop, and following the reasoning laid down in a more recent approach from the Bundeskartellamt, we propose a systematic methodology for evaluating the effects of MFNs, taking as a starting point of analysis OFDP market conditions and business models. Ultimately, we aim to address the balance between positive and negative effects of usingMFNs byOFDPs to incentivize platform investment and protect the efficiencies passed on to consumers and local restaurants.